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FAMILY LAW-APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IN
PATERNITY AND VISITATION CASES-MOMMY'S BABY, MAMA'S
MAYBE: A NEW YORK COURT'S DECISION TO HOLD A SAME-SEX
PARTNER FINANCIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR A NON-BIOLOGICAL AND
NON-ADOPTIVE CHILD. H.M. v. E. T., No. U-110-07 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
Sept. 11, 2007).
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional idea of the "nuclear family" consists of a hetero-
sexual married couple raising children together.' Traditionally, society
and the law recognized that each child has only one female mother
and one male father.2 Nevertheless, these traditional notions of the
nuclear family are becoming less universal because of the emergence
of cohabiting couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, who bear or
adopt children.' The changes to the nuclear family have created legal
challenges for homosexual couples. This is especially so for those who
become parents and later terminate their relationship.4 At the termi-
nation of the relationship, one issue that arises is whether a same-sex
partner who is not biologically or legally related to a child born during
the relationship may be held financially responsible for that child An
additional issue in these cases is often whether the partner without
biological or legal connection to the child may assert rights to visit
with the child upon termination of the relationship.6
In 2007, the Rockland County Family Law Court of New York
directly addressed the former issue and provided a cursory conclusion
on the latter issue In H.M. v. E. T. , a lesbian couple conceived a
child through artificial insemination The couple's relationship ended
shortly after the child's birth; thereafter, the birth mother sought child
1. HARRY D. KRAUSE & DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 2 (5th
ed. 2007).
2. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parent-
hood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Fam-
ilies, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 468 (1990).
3. KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 1, at 2. In 2007, less than a quarter of Ameri-
can households consisted of married couples raising children. KRAUSE & MEYER,
supra note 1, at 2.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007), avail-
able at 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6237.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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support from her former partner.'" The Family Court of New York
reversed a support magistrate's order dismissing the petition for child
support." The court ordered a hearing based upon years of state law
establishing equitable estoppel as an appropriate remedy for ordering
child support even though the person had no biological or legal rela-
tion to the child.
In addressing the issue of whether a former partner of a child's
biological or legal parent has visitation rights, the court concluded that
the former partner may not use equitable estoppel as a means to assert
any visitation rights. The court was correct in ruling that a hearing
was appropriate to determine whether the facts of the case established
equitable estoppel, thereby requiring the respondent to pay child sup-
port for a child with whom she had no biological and legal relation;
however, the court's holding failed to consider the inequalities of dis-
allowing the same parent from establishing visitation on the basis of
equitable estoppel.
This note begins with an overview of equitable estoppel.'4
Second, the note examines how the theory of equitable estoppel ap-
plies to paternity proceedings during which a parent seeks child sup-
port from a non-biological or non-adoptive parent, emphasizing that
equitable estoppel in this context is an appropriate remedy.'5 Third,
this note examines cases that have mostly held that equitable estoppel
is inapplicable to proceedings requesting visitation. 6 Fourth, the note
provides the facts and reasoning of the court in H.M. v. E. T.'7 Finally,
this note argues that the New York Family Court's decision was cor-
rect with respect to child support, but questions the court's refusal to
extend the theory of equitable estoppel to visitation proceedings. 8
10. Id.
11. Id. The chief administrator of the courts empowers a support magistrate "to
hear, determine and grant any relief within the powers of the court in [child support]
proceedings.... ." N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr LAW § 439(a) (Gould 2008). A support magi-
strate's authority, however, does not extend to "issues of contested paternity involving
claims of equitable estoppel, custody, visitation including visitation as a defense ..
Id.
12. See H.M, No. U-110-07, slip op. at 4-6.
13. Id. at 2-3.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
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II. BACKGROUND
This section first provides an overview of equitable estoppel.1 9
Next, it explores how New York courts' have applied the theory of
equitable estoppel in family law cases, specifically the courts' applica-
tion of the doctrine in paternity proceedings-cases in which one party
is seeking child support.2 ' Finally, it examines New York's refusal to
extend equitable estoppel to cases in which one party seeks visitation
with a minor child.'
A. An Overview of Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel is defined as "[a] defensive doctrine preventing
one party from taking unfair advantage of another when, through false lan-
guage or conduct, the person to be estopped has induced another person to
act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in
some way. ' 3 Equitable estoppel has been categorized as a "judge-made
law." 24 The paramount justification for applying this judge made law is
justice.2" Justice is an abstract concept, so scholars have criticized the
theory of equitable estoppel for providing "standards" and not "rules." 6
According to one scholar, "[s]tandards are applied realistically and de-
pend on value judgments;" whereas rules are "applied formalistically
and depend on factual determinations."2' Proponents of equitable
estoppel like the flexibility standards give courts.' As time proceeds,
standards evolve to fit a court's meaning whereas rules are more
fixed .29
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. The state of New York has a unique court structure. New York State Unified
Court System, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/structure.shtml (last visited April
13, 2008). The lowest civil courts described in this note are called Supreme Courts or
Family Courts and are cited using the abbreviation of N.Y. Sup. Ct. or N.Y. Fam. Ct..
Id. New York's intermediate appellate courts are called Appellate Terms of the Su-
preme Court and are cited using the abbreviation of N.Y. App. Div. The highest civil
court is called the Court of Appeals and is cited using the abbreviation of N.Y. Id.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 590 (8th ed. 2004).
24. T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel
Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 633, 641 (2007).
25. Id. at 640.
26. Id. at 640-41.
27. Id. at 642.
28. Id. at 643.
29. Id. at 643.
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B. Equitable Estoppel: A Sufficient Remedy in Cases Seeking Child
Support
Historically, a child born to an unmarried couple was not entitled
to financial support from his or her biological father."° Modernly,
courts have become more willing to enforce a financial obligation on
unwed biological fathers and others when the courts conclude that the
parent had explicitly and impliedly agreed to assume financially re-
sponsibility for the child.3' In paternity cases involving equitable es-
toppel, the court's fundamental goal is to serve the best interests of
the child.32 This section will first explore the concept of legitimacy and
its historical use to limit financial obligations of some biological fa-
thers.33 Next, this section discusses the elimination of legitimacy and
the rise of equitable estoppel. ' Finally, this section concludes with an
exploration of equitable estoppel and its elements of proof.
35
1. A Historical Requirement: Legitimacy
Under English common law, a child's legal status depended on
the marital status of the child's parent.36 If the child was born to a
married couple, the child was "legitimate and entitled to support and
inheritance from the father., 37 If the child's parents were not married,
the child was illegitimate or a bastard and had no right to financial
support from the biological father.3 ' Between 1968 and 1983, the
United States Supreme Court eliminated the common law treatment
of illegitimate children, holding that the distinction between marital
and nonmarital children was unconstitutional.39 Legislators then be-
gan passing state statutes that provided "support rights to the nonma-
rital child upon proof of paternity. ' 4°
30. See infra Part II.B.1.
31. David M. Cotter, Putting Family Ties First... and Science Second: Using Pa-
ternity Estoppel to Establish or Disprove Fatherhood, 25 FAM. ADVOCATE 22, 28
(2002).
32. Id.
33. See infra Part II.B.1.
34. See infra Part II.B.1.
35. See infra Part II.B.2.-3.
36. RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS
226 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 2000).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. JOHN DEW=rr GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 119 (2005).
40. Id.
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Proof of paternity is established in a paternity suit.41 In addition
to establishing whether a person is the parent of a child, a paternity
suit is brought in an effort to obtain child support.42 In paternity pro-
ceedings, equitable estoppel may act as a theory to hold those not in-
cluded in the definition of a parent 3 financially responsible for a child
if he or she induces another to rely on his or her conduct when decid-
ing to conceive a child. ' Equitable estoppel has two basic elements:
inducement and injury.45 It is the responsibility of the party seeking
child support to establish a prima facie showing of equitable estop-
pel.46
2. Element Number One: Inducement
The inducement element of equitable estoppel may be met by
three types of agreements-written, implied, or hybrid.
a. Written agreement
A written agreement can serve as factual evidence of induce-
ment.47  In Karin T v. Michael T.,4 a New York Family Court ad-
dressed a factual situation of first impression-whether a woman
could be a father for child support purposes.49 Karin, the petitioner,
alleged that Michael, the respondent, was the father of her two child-
ren and thereby sought child support from the respondent.' As an
affirmative defense, the respondent asserted that she was a female and
therefore could not be the father of Karin's children.5
During the respondent's twenties, she became dissatisfied with
her life as a female and began living as a male." Shortly thereafter,
the respondent and petitioner began a relationship, and in 1977 the
41. Carlotta P. Wells, Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Proceedings: Barring an
'Illegitimate's' Right to Support, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 567,568(1983).
42. Id. at 571.
43. Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238, 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (Mercure,
J.P., concurring) (defining parent as "one who begets, gives birth to, or nurtures and
raises a child").
44. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
45. See infra Part II.B.2.-3.
46. H.M. v. E. T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 2.
47. See Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 782.
50. Id. at 781.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 781.
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parties had a marriage ceremony and obtained a marriage license. 3
Three years later, Karin gave birth to the parties' first child by artifi-
cial insemination.' Three years after the first child, Karen gave birth
to a second child, also through artificial insemination.55 Before peti-
tioner had the procedure, the respondent executed a written agree-
ment indicating that she was the petitioner's husband and that the
children conceived through artificial insemination were "his own legi-
timate child[ren]" and "that he ... waive[d] forever any right.., to
disclaim such child[ren]. 56
The court rejected the respondent's defense that she could not be
a parent based on her inability to biologically conceive children with
the petitioner. 7 Instead, the court concluded that the respondent was
a parent and, therefore, liable for child support because she became a
parent when she executed an agreement that "brought forth . . .
offspring as if done biologically.""8 Furthermore, the document signed
by the respondent induced the birth of the children, and the doctrine
of equitable estoppel precluded her from acts that would be detrimen-
tal to those children. The court concluded that the respondent was
responsible for child support and ordered a hearing to determine the
level of support.'
b. Implied Agreement
Prior to Karin T and before the United States Supreme Court
held that differential treatment of an illegitimate child was unconstitu-
tional, a New York state trial court, in Gursky v. Gursky,6' concluded
that a husband had impliedly agreed to financially support a child con-
ceived through artificial insemination by consenting to his wife's re-
quest to undergo the procedure, even though he had not signed a writ-
ten agreement.62 The child born from the procedure was technically
illegitimate under New York law because the child was not biological-
53. Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). At the
time the petitioner and respondent applied for a marriage license, the state did not
require either party to produce a birth certificate to determine gender.
54. Id. at 781-82.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 782.
57. Id. at 784.
58. Id.
59. Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780,784 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985).
60. Id.
61. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (1963).
62 Id. at 411.
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ly conceived by the husband; however, the court concluded that the
husband's declarations and conduct served to affirm and support his
wife's insemination.63 His actions, therefore, acted as a promise to
furnish support for the resulting child. ' Furthermore, the court de-
termined that relieving the husband of financial duty would financially
burden the mother and would be inequitable because the mother
submitted to the insemination in reliance on her husband's promise of
support.6'
Just a few years after Gursky, a New York appellate court had to
decide Wener v. Wener,66 and whether a husband could be held finan-
cially responsible for a child--even though neither he nor his wife
were biologically related to the child-because he had made an im-
plied promise to his wife to support the child.67 In Wener, the husband
and wife desired to have a child but were unable to conceive biologi-
cally.M The parties learned that a baby, born and living out-of-state,
was ready for immediate adoption.69 The husband made arrangements
for his wife to pick up the newborn. 70 Upon his wife's return, the hus-
band had baby necessities waiting, and he took the child to a synago-
gue to be named in accordance with the parties' religious faith.71 The
husband also claimed the baby as a dependent for purposes of filing
federal income tax returns and expressed his love for the baby upon
separation from his wife.72
Shortly after separating, the wife sought child support from her
husband, even though the husband had not legally adopted the child.73
The husband contended that he was not responsible for the baby be-
cause he was neither its biological nor its adoptive father and argued
that the state statute only required a natural or adoptive parent to be
responsible for support.74 The court concluded otherwise and deter-
mined that he and his wife were the only parents the baby knew, and
by agreeing to adopt, support, and treat the child as his own, the hus-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 412.
66. Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
67. Id. at 817.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815,817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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band could not disavow his obligation to support the child . Accord-
ing to the court, the husband's actions operated as consent to adopt
the child, and the court held that the husband's obligation of support
was founded upon an implied agreement and equitable estoppel."6
c. Hybrid: written and implied promises
In the wake of case law establishing that the inducement element
of equitable estoppel could be fulfilled by reliance on a written or im-
plied promise, New York's highest appellate court had to decide
whether a father could be held financially responsible for a non-
biological child based on his written consent and implied actions that
were relied upon by his child.77 In that case-Shondel J. v. Mark
D.78-Mark was a citizen of New York and Shondel was a resident of
Guyana.79 When Mark visited Guyana, he and Shondel had sexual
intercourse, and shortly thereafter, Shondel gave birth to a child.'°
Mark provided financial support, visited Guyana to see the child, no-
tarized a sworn statement that he was the child's father, and accepted
all child support obligations." Furthermore, he authorized the child to
take his surname, named the child as his primary beneficiary, and
identified the child as his daughter to the public.2
After Mark took these actions, Shondel sought orders of filiation
and support and Mark sought visitation rights in a New York court. 3
Upon the request of Mark, a family court hearing examiner ordered a
DNA test, which concluded that Mark was not the child's biological
father.' Using the theory of equitable estoppel, the appellate court
concluded that Mark was responsible for child support because his
actions gave rise to an implied promise to father the child-he "held
himself out as the child's father and behaved in every way as if he was
the father," although he did so under a mistaken belief that the child
was his biological daughter.85
75. Id. at 818.
76. Id.
77. This was the first instance that a New York court considered the child's re-
liance on the alleged father's actions rather than the reliance of the child's mother.
78. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006).
79. Id. at 611.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 612.
84. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 612 (N.Y. 2006).
85. Id.
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3. Element Number Two: Injury
A party seeking to assert equitable estoppel in a paternity pro-
ceeding must prove that they were induced and that injury to them-
selves or the best interests of the child will or has occurred from the
party denying paternity and financial support. 6 In addition to the
element of inducement, in Shondel J., the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court on the grounds that one may be estopped from denying
paternity because an injury-actions contrary to the best interests of
the child--occurredY The court laid out four factors to be considered
when determining whether it would be in the best interest of a child to
preclude a party from denying paternity: (1) the child has established a
strong parent-child bond with the party;' (2) a man held himself out as
the child's father; 9 (3) the child's psyche would be damaged by ending
the relationship;' and (4) cutting off support would leave the child in a
worse position.91 The court reasoned that it should protect a child's
interest in a "recognized and operative parent-child relationship" be-
cause the child would be harmed by learning that someone else was
his or her father.' Furthermore, the court determined that the best
interests of the child were paramount so that even a DNA marker test
could not be ordered if it infringed on the best interests of a child,
even if the alleged father relied on inaccurate facts in initiating the
relationship with the child.93
Ultimately, the court decided that Mark assumed the role of the
child's father, which caused the child to form a bond with him.94 As a
result, denial of paternity or financial responsibility, upon which the
child relied, would be detrimental to the child and contrary to the
child's best interests.95
86. Id. at 612.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 613.
89. Id. at 614.
90. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610,615 (N.Y. 2006).
91. Id. at 616.
92. Id. at 613-14 (internal citation omitted).
93. Id. at 615.
94. Id. at 614.
95. Id. at 614.
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C. Equitable Estoppel: An Insufficient Remedy in Cases Seeking
Visitation
Unlike the previous cases, in which biological parents attempted
to recover child support from nonbiolgical parents using estoppel, cus-
tody cases were the first cases in which New York's highest court in-
itially addressed whether a non-biological party could assert rights
against a child's biological parent.96 The principal case, Bennett v. Jef-
freys,7 established that a party may seek custody rights of a non-
biological child if it is in that child's best interest and rare extraordi-
nary circumstances affecting the child's welfare exist.98 In Ronald FF.
v. Cindy GG.,99 however, the same court refused to extend this prin-
ciple to cases in which a non-biological parent sought visitation rights
with a child.1"
1. Non-Biological Parents Are Not Entitled to Visitation Rights
In Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., Ronald, a nonbiolgical father,
sought visitation with Cindy's child whom he believed to be his biolog-
ical child.10' The results of a DNA test excluded Ronald as the child's
biological father, but the family court concluded that it was in the best
interest of the child to continue regular visitation with Ronald and
that extraordinary circumstances warranted visitation. 2 On appeal,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision
and held that "visitation [was] a subspecies of custody," but visitation
and custody fundamentally differed in such a way that extending the
extraordinary circumstances doctrine of Bennett v. Jeffreys was prec-
luded. 3 The court reasoned that such extension would interfere with
the biological parent's fundamental right to choose with whom the
96. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976). In this case, a biologi-
cal mother sought custody of her daughter from the respondent, a non-biological parent. Id.
at 280. The non-biological caretaker sought to maintain custody of the child based on the
biological mother's prolonged separation from the child. Id.
97. 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
98. Id. at 285. Extraordinary circumstances include "surrender, abandonment,
persist[ent] neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary disruption of custody
over an extended period of time." Id. at 282.
99. 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987).
100. Id. at 77.
101. Id. at 76.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 77.
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child associates.1" Nevertheless, the court outlined a narrow excep-
tion: a court may interfere with a parent's choice of association if there
is a "compelling State purpose which further[ed] the child's best inter-
est."105
In Alison D. v. Virginia M.,' 6 the court of appeals, for a second
time, addressed the issue of whether a party had standing to seek visi-
tation with a child with whom that party had no biological connec-
tion. °  Alison D. involved a lesbian couple that agreed to conceive a
child through artificial insemination." Shortly after the birth of the
child, the parties separated and, eventually, the child's birth mother
severed communication with the petitioner." The petitioner never
expressly raised the issue of equitable estoppel; instead, the petitioner
asserted that she was a parent of the child because she developed a
relationship with the child and had a relationship with the child's
mother, and therefore, she had a right to visitation under a statute
governing parental visitation.11 ° The court clarified its earlier decision
by stating that a court could not interfere with the choice made by a fit
parent in deciding what is in the best interest of the parent's child.1
Even if it was beneficial to continue visitation with the child, the court
concluded that the state statute was not intended to compel a parent
to allow visitation nor was it designed to include a de facto parent in
the definition of parent.'
2
2. Lower Courts Rebel Against the Trend
In 1998, a New York appellate court heard Jean Maby H. v. Jo-
seph H.,13 a case in which the lower court granted a wife's motion
seeking to determine whether the father had standing to seek visita-
tion with a non-biological child."' At the time of the proceedings, the
104. Id.
105. Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987). Compelling state
purpose is found if the facts indicate "surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent
neglect ... or extended disruption of custody . . . which would drastically affect the
welfare of the child." Id.
106. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
107. Id. at 28.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 29.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
113. 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
114. Id. at 682.
20091
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defendant husband and plaintiff wife were married and biologically
shared one child.'15 The plaintiff, however, also had another child
from a previous relationship; in fact, she was pregnant with her first
child and gave birth to it shortly after meeting the defendant and mov-
ing in with him." 6 After ending the relationship and against the plain-
tiff's wishes, the defendant sought visitation with both the non-
biological child and biological child."7 Contrary to precedent, the ap-
pellate court held that the defendant could be entitled to visitation
with both the biological and non-biological children if he established a
prima facie case of equitable estoppel, and the court found that it was
in the best interest of the child to award visitation. 8
The appellate court distinguished Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H.
from prior case law by concluding that unlike the defendant in Ronald
FF., the present defendant raised the issue of equitable estoppel, and
unlike the parties in Alison D., the defendant was not homosexual and
fully addressed the issue of equitable estoppel."9 After providing a
factual distinction between its case and prior case law, the court de-
termined that a greater emphasis should be placed on the best inter-
ests of the child.' The court concluded that the best interest of the
child would not be served by denying visitation with the non-biological
father, as the court did in Ronald FF. and in Allison D.
2 1
In J.C. v. C.T., 122 a New York state family court adopted the Jean
Maby H. court's line of thinking when it denied a respondent's motion
to dismiss a petitioner's request for visitation with the respondent's
biological children." In order to comply with the legal principle of
stare decisis, the court stated that no prior precedent specifically ans-
wered the issue of "whether a biological parent may be equitably es-
topped from denying a same-sex partner visitation, due to his or her
own actions in creating, nurturing and encouraging a parent-child rela-tionship. ,, "z
In J. C., the respondent and petitioner were engaged in a same-sex
relationship during which two children were born via artificial insemi-
115. Id. at 678.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 682.
119. Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677,681 (N.Y. 1991).
120. Id..
121. Id. at 682.
122. J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 300 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 742 N.Y.S.2d
381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 298.
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nation.'2 The court ordered a subsequent hearing to determine if
denial of visitation with the non-biological parent would be in the best
interest of the child.'2 First, the court concluded that the petitioner
had a legal basis for asserting visitation because (1) the respondent's
actions facilitated the bond between the petitioner and the children,
(2) the petitioner assumed parental obligations, and (3) the children
demonstrated a psychological bond with the petitioner." The court
reasoned that the three-step test was most equitable because it ba-
lanced the child's interest in maintaining a connection with adults,
with whom the child has developed a bond, and the competing interest
of the biological and non-biological parents."
3. The Appellate Courts Return to the Trend
The lower court's holding in J. C. v. C. T and the appellate court's
holdings in Jean Maby H. gave rise to some inconsistency in New
York's application of equitable estoppel in visitation cases, but the
trend of disallowing the application of equitable estoppel continued.129
In 2002, a New York appellate court reversed J.C. v. C.T., holding
that, although courts had applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel in
cases involving paternity, an extension of the doctrine to cases involv-
ing visitation between same-sex partners was inappropriate.30 The
court concluded that the New York Legislature had not extended the
meaning of "parent" to include a parent by estoppel, a de facto parent,
or a psychological parent-all categories of parentage in which the
same-sex partner claimed she derived her right to visitation.'
In 2004, a New York court in C.M. v. C.H. 132 further expounded
on the other cases that refused to extend equitable estoppel to visita-
125. Id. at 296.
126. Id. at 299.
127. Id.
128. 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298-99 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 742 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002).
129. Compare Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682 (N.Y. 1991) (con-
cluding that the best interest of the child would not be served by denying the non-
biological father visitation with the child), and J.C. v. C. T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 2000) (concluding that a same-sex partner had standing to seek visitation with a
non-biological child), with Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002), and C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393, 398-399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding
that the New York legislature did not intend for a non-biological party to be included
in the categories of individuals who have a right to seek visitation with a child).
130. Janis C. v. Christine T, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
131. Id. at 382.
132. 789 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
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tion cases.' With the consent of the petitioner, the respondent con-
ceived two children through artificial insemination, one of which was
legally adopted by the petitioner. 4 Prior to the adoption of the
second child, the couple ended their relationship, and the respondent
refused to let the petitioner continue a relationship with the non-
adopted child.' The petitioner asserted that she acted as the primary
caregiver of the child,3 6 and, despite the court's opposite holding, she
argued that the respondent should be equitably estopped from deny-
ing visitation.137 The court first rejected the petitioner's contention
that equitable estoppel applied to visitation cases by affirming that
only three types of people are entitled by state statute to seek visita-
138tion with a child: parents, siblings, and grandparents.
Citing prior holdings by the New York Court of Appeals, the
court stated that the right to visitation did not extend to the petitioner
because she was not the child's biological or legal parent.139 Even if
continuing visitation with the child would benefit the child, the court
determined that the legislature did not intend for the statute to com-
pel a biological parent to allow such visitation. 1"° The court held that
an extension of such rights must come from the legislature, not the
court.' The legal principle of stare decisis supported the court's de-
termination that equitable estoppel failed to provided the petitioner
standing.'42 Unless a court can articulate a factual difference that dis-
tinguishes a case from the precedent of the highest state court, the
trend to deny standing to a non-biological, non-adoptive parent seek-
ing visitation, even on the equitable grounds of estoppel, will continue.
III. THE CASE
A. Facts
The petitioner and respondent were engaged in a lesbian rela-
tionship from August 1989 until January 1995.43 In the early stages of
133. Id. at 400-01.
134. Id. at 398.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 398.
137. Id. at 399.
138. C.M. v. C.M., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393,399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 401.
142. Id.
143. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
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the couple's relationship, they planned how they could pursue their
educational and career ambitions while also becoming parents)"
First, the couple decided that the petitioner would remain unem-
ployed and act as the caregiver of the respondent's children while the
respondent attended chiropractor school.145  Once the respondent
completed school and began to work, the couple planned for the peti-
tioner to obtain her degree in social work. 46
In addition to career plans, the couple planned to conceive and
raise a child.1'47 The couple's parenting plans included extensive details
as to "how their children would be raised as siblings, how the children
would address each parent and how the children would attend the
same schools."' 8 After failing eleven times at artificial insemination,
the respondent impregnated the petitioner by personally inseminating
the petitioner with vials of sperm.1 49 On September 20, 1994, in care of
a midwife and as the parties planned, the petitioner gave birth to Ryan
M. at the parties' home.5 The respondent was present for the birth
and cut the child's umbilical cord.15 The respondent cared for and
nurtured the child, Ryan M., during the first four months of his life,
but in January 1995, the respondent ended her relationship with the
petitioner and failed to provide adequate support for the child, despite
the petitioner's request. 2 Because the petitioner had no income, she
and Ryan M. moved to Canada to live with her parents.5
On January 5, 2007, the petitioner filed a petition seeking orders
to establish paternity and child support under the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act. 5 4 Prior to a hearing and at the request of the
respondent, the support magistrate dismissed the petition and held
that the laws of New York did not allow an order of paternity under
the facts of the petitioner's case."5 The petitioner appealed the dis-
missal to the Rockland County Family Court and argued that equita-
ble estoppel prevented the respondent from avoiding child support
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1.
155. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
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obligations."6 The petitioner asserted that she had relied on the "res-
pondent's promise to support the child when she (petitioner) agreed
to become inseminated," and furthermore that "the respondent's
promise had acted to deprive the child of support from a biological
father." '57
B. Reasoning
The Rockland County Family Court of New York reversed the
support magistrate's order of dismissal.' The court held that a hear-
ing was necessary to determine if equitable estoppel required the res-
pondent to be financially responsible for a child whom the petitioner
allegedly conceived in reliance on the respondent's conduct 59 The
court began its analysis by noting that the facts of the case and any
reasonable statements that may be implied from the non-moving par-
ty's allegations must be treated as true when considering a motion to
dismiss.'60 Additionally, the court stated that on appeal it must draw
any inferences in favor of the petitioner-the non-moving party.161
The court also acknowledged that a paternity case invoking the theory
of equitable estoppel required the moving party to make "a prima
facie showing of facts... support[ing] equitable estoppel... [and] the
opponent of equitable estoppel must demonstrate why estoppel
should not be applied in the best interests of the child."'62 Upon these
foundations, the court concluded that it was possible to find that the
respondent should be estopped from denying financial support to
Ryan M.'63
In reaching its decision to grant the petitioner a hearing, the court
reviewed New York case law regarding the financial obligations of a
non-biological, non-adoptive parent. 64 First, the court distinguished
this case from Karin T. v. Michael T,"6 which held that the execution
of a written agreement accepting liability for a child with whom the
executor had no biological connection was sufficient to support a rul-
156. Id. at 2.
157. Id. at 1-2.
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id. at 5-6.
160. Id. at 2.
161. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id. at 5.
164. See id. at 3-5.
165. 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985).
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ing for child support.' 66 The court concluded that the current case was
distinguishable because the parties did not create a written agree-
ment.167 Instead, the court found that the petitioner and respondent
had an implied agreement, which arose through "inference from the
facts and circumstances of the case, although not formally stated in
words."'8
After determining that an express agreement can financially bind
a person and child who are not biologically related, the court eva-
luated whether an implied contract could financially obligate a person
to pay child support for a child to whom he or she is not legally re-
lated. 69 In Wener v. Wener,'7° the court stated that the petitioner-
husband was financially liable for a child whom he and his wife were
in the process of adopting."' Though the adoption was not final, and
therefore no legal connection yet existed between the child and hus-
band, the child lived with the couple, and they were the only parents
the child knew. The Wener court stated that, because the father
treated the child as his own, he could not disavow his financial obliga-
tions to the child.' Moreover, the Wener court found that such obli-
gation could arise from an implied contract and equitable estoppel.'
The court then addressed the underlying reasons why equitable
estoppel is an appropriate legal theory to hold a person financially
responsible for a child with whom he or she has no biological or legal
connection.17' The court started its analysis by citing Shondel J. v.
Mark D. ,76 which established that the best interest of the child is the
sole consideration in applying equitable estoppel to paternity cases.77
Furthermore, the best interest of the child can require the court to
estop a person from denying financial responsibility when that person
behaved as the child's parent.
7 8
166. H.M., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 3.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. (quoting Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1985)).
169. Id.
170. 312 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
171. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006).
177. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
178. Id.
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The court concluded its review of case law with a discussion of
two New York statutes that prevent courts from ordering a DNA test
if it is in the best interest of the child not to do so.'79 Using the state
statute, the court held that a biological connection with the child is not
a factor the court must consider in applying equitable estoppel.
18
Therefore, because the issue of biology is irrelevant and because the
petitioner in H.M. v. E.T. relied on the respondent's conduct in con-
ceiving the child, the court held that the petitioner could proceed
against the respondent for child support for Ryan M. based on the
theory of equitable estoppel.' The court then scheduled a hearing to
determine if equitable estoppel was applicable in the current case. 8
IV. ANALYSIS
The following section discusses why the New York Family Court
was correct in holding that state case law supports the application of
equitable estoppel to homosexual families.83 This section will then
address the court's failure to consider the inequities that follow from
not allowing the same theory of equitable estoppel to apply to former
partners who want to assert visitation rights."l In order to resolve the
inconsistency of the court, this note proposes that a former partner
should be entitled to visitation with a child if the partner can success-
fully prove that visitation would be in the best interest of the child."'
A. Equitable Estoppel is an Appropriate Remedy in Cases Seeking
Child Support
In child support cases, the court's analysis must focus "on the
child, and the protection of his rights, interests, and welfare."
' 86
Though the H.M. v. E. T. court did not explicitly hold that equitable
estoppel applies to paternity cases involving same-sex couples, it im-
plicitly did so by ordering a hearing to determine if the case satisfied
the elements of equitable estoppel."" In extending the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to same-sex paternity cases, the H.M v. E. T. court
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 5-6.
182. Id. at 5-6.
183. See infra Part IV.A.
184. See infra Part IV.B.
185. See infra Part IV.B.
186. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
187. Id. at 5-6.
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decided that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was gender neutral."
Thus, the court agreed with previous case law concluding that the best
interest of a child outweighed a defense of non-biological or non-legal
relation. '89
The court correctly determined that equitable estoppel was gend-
er neutral because statutory and case law supported the premise that
biological relation is not necessary to hold one responsible for child
support.' 90 The legislature's intent in enacting a state statute that di-
rects courts not to order a DNA test is furthered by a court's ruling
that the DNA test results would run contrary to the best interest of
the child.19' Therefore, in cases supporting an application of equitable
estoppel, scientific evidence of biological relation is unnecessary be-
cause biology is irrelevant; instead, the court determines financial re-
sponsibility based on fairness and the parties' actions-inducement,
reliance, and injury. 92 Even if there is no biological relation, the bio-
logical parent can prevail using this equitable doctrine by proving that
he or she relied on the non-biological party's promise or actions in
conceiving a child and breaking the promise would cause an emotional
or financial injury to the child. 93 Equitable estoppel only considers
whether there is inducement, reliance on that inductive behavior, and
a resulting injury." Such a bright-line rule should apply to same-sex
and opposite sex couples if, as in the case of H. M. v. E. T., the prima
facie elements are met.'95
First, while the respondent in this case did not sign a written
agreement accepting financial responsibility for Ryan M., her actions
provide implicit sources of inducement.' 96 Prior to Ryan M.'s concep-
tion, the petitioner and respondent actively planned to have a child
together via artificial insemination.19" The respondent was not a mere
observer to the insemination because she played an active role in the
conception-in fact, she personally implanted the vials containing
sperm into the petitioner that conceived Ryan M.98
188. Id. at 5.
189. Id.
190. See N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACr LAW § 418(a) (2007); Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853
N.E.2d 610, 615 (N.Y. 2006).
191. H.M., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 5.
192. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id. at 5.
196. See id. at 1.
197. Id.at 1.
198. H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007).
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The body is a personal and an intimate object, and no reasonable
person would believe that the respondent would engage in such acts
and make career and parental plans with the petitioner if she had no
desire to assume the role of the child's second parent. The respon-
dent's actions were substantial enough to conclude that the respon-
dent held herself out as Ryan M.'s second parent and that the peti-
tioner relied on respondent's actions before and after the birth of
Ryan M.
Secondly, the last element of equitable estoppel was met because
it was reasonable to assume that, because both Ryan M. and the peti-
tioner relied on the respondent, both would sustain injury if she failed
to uphold her responsibilities. The most apparent harm to the peti-
tioner would be financial because economic support would be reduced
from the contribution of two parents to only one. Once the couple's
relationship ended, the petitioner was so financially challenged that
she moved out of the home she and the respondent had shared and
moved into her parent's home.'"
In addition to financial injury, Ryan M. would sustain psychologi-
cal injury from relying on the respondent's actions. One could argue
that Ryan M. would not suffer psychological injury because he was
only four-months old when the respondent ended her relationship
with the petitioner, and therefore, Ryan M.'s emotional connection
with the respondent was minimal.' ° Although Ryan M. was an infant
and unable to communicate his feelings at the time the respondent
and petitioner separated,"' Ryan M. will eventually grow up and be-
come aware that he has only one parent, and that while the respon-
dent played a vital role in his infancy, she chose not to continue her
relationship with him. So although Ryan M. may not feel the imme-
diate psychological effects of the respondent's desertion, it is reasona-
ble to believe that he may feel some anxiety as he matures.
Together, the petitioner and respondent were the only parents
Ryan M. knew, and once the parent-child relationship between Ryan
M. and the respondent was established, it would be harmful and ine-
quitable to allow the respondent to unilaterally decide to end the rela-
tionship without evaluating the harm it would cause to Ryan M. and
the petitioner. This is true regardless of whether the couple was ho-
mosexual or heterosexual.
199. Id. at 2.
200. See id. at 2.
201. Id.
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Moreover, because the child's best interest is the sole considera-
tion in applying equitable estoppel,2' the sexual classification of the
couple is irrelevant because a child's best interests are not affected by
the sex of the person who provides the monetary and psychological
support. 3 In either case, the child's best interest is affected by not
receiving that support. The respondent created a parent-child rela-
tionship with Ryan and held herself out to be Ryan's second parent by
playing a vital role in his conception, symbolically cutting his umbilical
cord at birth, and nurturing and caring for Ryan during the first four
months of his life.2° Therefore, it was irrelevant to the equitable es-
toppel analysis that Ryan M.'s parents were both women. The peti-
tioner established the prima facie elements of equitable estoppel. On
that basis, the court was correct in setting a hearing.05
B. Equitable Estoppel is Also an Appropriate Remedy in Cases
Seeking Visitation
New York courts have routinely heard cases in which one party
asserts equitable estoppel as a means to preclude the other party from
denying paternity.2° The issue, however, as to how a court should
handle a party who uses the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude a
biological parent from cutting off visitation with a child is less clear. The
H.M. v. E.T. court failed to answer this question and simply stated that con-
trolling law does not give a same-sex partner standing to seek visitation.Y
The court's statement was premised on the underlying idea that a bio-
logical parent has the right to choose with whom their child associates
and to allow a non-biological person to assert visitation rights against
the biological parent's wishes interferes with that right.2°
New York's highest court has held that a party has no standing to
sue for visitation with a non-biological child unless there is a "compel-
ling State purpose [, such as surrender, abandonment, neglect, or un-
fitness on the part of the biological parent,] which furthers the child's
best interest., 2' Furthermore, the court determined that the state leg-
202. Id. at 5.
203. See generally H.M. v. E.T., No. U-110-01, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept.
11, 2007) (discussing gender of the person against whom equitable estoppel is being
applied).
204. Id. at 2.
205. Id. at 5-6.
206. See supra Part II.B.
207. H.M., No. U-110-07, slip op. at 2-3.
208. Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75,77 (N.Y. 1987).
209. Id.
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islature, through statutes, did not intend for de facto parents to have
the right to seek visitation.2"
Despite this holding, the best interest of the child should be the
overriding concern in visitation cases, just as it is in paternity cases."
Thus, the courts should do away with a stringent and exhaustive list of
what constitutes a compelling purpose, along with a strict interpreta-
tion of the legislatures' meaning of parent. Non-biological, non-
adoptive parents should be allowed to argue that the best interest of
the child warrants visitation. The court in Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H
212
adopted a similar argument and held that a non-biological partner had
standing to seek visitation if he proved the elements of equitable es-
toppel, and the court determined that visitation would serve the
child's best interest.2 3
The legal doctrine of equitable estoppel calls for courts to use discre-
tion in order to do what is reasonable and fair.2 1' Therefore, in visitation
proceedings, the doctrine should be applied to produce fair and reasonable
results for all parties involved-including the child .21 To determine what is
fair for a child, an evaluation of the child's best interest must occur. 6 The
American Law Institute, a highly respected entity, recommended that it is
within a child's best interest to continue an existing parent-child relation-
217
ship. Severing an established relationship based on a lack of biological
connection could be psychologically detrimental to a child. Parental
bonds are established through love, trust, and respect, not through the mere
fact that a child and an adult are related by blood.
The biological parent's right to decide who may influence their child
as the child grows into adulthood is still important.2" If the relationship
with the non-biological parent does not further the best interest of the child,
the biological parent retains that right. If, however, after weighing several
discretionary factors the court determines that the child's best interest is
served by the relationship, the parent's right must yield to the overriding
goal of furthering and sustaining the child's interest. To determine if visi-
210. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
211. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 612 (N.Y. 2006).
212. 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
213. Id. at 682.
214. Anenson, supra note 24, at 643.
215. WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE 152 (2d ed. 2007).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See supra Part IV.A.
219. Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987).
220. Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238,243 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (Mercure, J.P.,
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tation with a non-biological person is appropriate, the court should consider
factors such as (1) the child's desire to continue the relationship; (2) wheth-
er the non-biological party assumed other parental obligations (child sup-
port); and (3) whether the biological parent encouraged the relationship
between the child and non-biological party.22' This list is not exhaustive but
provides a starting point for courts to consider.
Additionally, it is important for the legislature to amend the statutory
definition of "parent" to include a person who has lived with the child and
regularly performed caretaking functions, 2 and one who, through daily
contact with the child, has become a source that fulfills the child's physical,
emotional, and psychological needs m An amendment to the state statue
would provide notice and workable guidelines in visitation cases.
If the goal is to protect the child's welfare, it is inconsistent to allow a
biological parent to use equitable estoppel in paternity proceedings to pro-
tect the child's financial well-being but deny a non-biological parent the
opportunity to use estoppel as a means to protect the mental and emotional
psyche of the child.24 It is illogical to continue this one-sided application of
the doctrine.2 Some cases asserting visitation based on equitable estoppel
will not prevail because visitation would not be in the best interest of the
child, but extending the doctrine to such cases would ensure that both the
226
child's financial and emotion interests are taken into account.
Moreover, the best interests of the child remain the ultimate goal, and
basing decisions on the actions of the parties and not their sexuality will
ensure fulfillment of that goal. Due to societal changes in traditional family
structure and, in some states, recognition of homosexual unions, the New
York courts and legislatures should evolve to become blind to sexuality and
focus on the needs of its citizens. 227 Hopefully, a case involving the issues
presented in H.M. v. E.T. will give the New York Court of Appeals an op-
portunity to provide binding state case law that will do away with its prior
strict application of equitable estoppel in visitation cases and allow a more
appropriate focus on the child's best interest.
concurring).
221. Id. at 244.
222. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (2002).
223. JOHN C. MAYOUE, COMPETING INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS
AND DUTIES OF THIRD PARTIES, SPOUSES, AND SIGNIFICANT OTHERS, 124 (1998).
224. See Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 1, at 2.
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V. CONCLUSION
Courts have widely applied equitable estoppel to paternity cases.
They have been willing to use their equitable power to enforce child
support obligations, regardless of how those obligations were first es-
tablished. The fundamental principle in equitable estoppel cases is the
best interests of the child. Equitable estoppel affords courts the op-
portunity to enforce the parties' promises, both explicit and implied,
that serve those best interests. It is now time for courts to extend
equitable estoppel to non-biological parents seeking visitation rights.
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